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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-12-cr-00295-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2021 
_______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and MATEY, 
Circuit Judges. 
 















PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Dextrick Lawton appeals from the District Court’s April 21, 2020 Order 
denying his Motion for a Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We 
will affirm.  
I 
In 2012, a grand jury indicted Lawton for conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), and 
846. Lawton ultimately consented to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) 
(“Type–C”) agreement to plead guilty to the § 846 charge in exchange for an agreed-
upon sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised 
release and a special assessment fee. The plea included the government’s agreement not 
to file an Information under 21 U.S.C. § 8511 (“§ 851 Information”) and the parties’ 
stipulation that the applicable controlled substance for purposes of sentencing was one to 
three kilograms of heroin. 
Following that agreement, but before a plea hearing, Lawton submitted a pro se 
letter to the District Court requesting that it substitute Lawton’s court-appointed counsel 
with new counsel. During oral argument on that request, the prosecutor indicated that he 
believed Lawton’s request was intended as a delaying tactic and stated that the 
government would consider the plea agreement rejected if the District Court granted the 
motion. The government further explained that there had been a “death of an individual 
 





in connection with” the conspiracy and said that it would “move forward with the other 
charges” if Lawton rejected the plea offer. Supp. App. 9–10. After a brief recess, Lawton 
notified the District Court that he would accept the plea offer, and the District Court 
denied as moot Lawton’s request for new counsel. A plea hearing ensued shortly 
thereafter, and the District Court accepted Lawton’s plea.   
 Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”) that calculated Lawton’s Guideline range of imprisonment 
as 151 to 188 months. The PSR also stated that Lawton held a leadership role in the drug 
conspiracy, which resulted in a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and 
identified Lawton’s activities as causing the overdose death of an individual. Lawton 
objected to the inclusion of those paragraphs in the PSR, and the Probation Office issued 
a PSR addendum addressing those objections and stating that it stood by their inclusion. 
At sentencing, Lawton asked that those paragraphs be excised from the PSR 
because they would be used in determining his classification at the Bureau of Prisons. 
The District Court agreed, reasoning they “may impact the defendant’s placement in a 
prison,” but did not make any finding as to the veracity of the paragraphs. App. 73.  
Lawton later moved for a reduction of his 180-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2), invoking Amendment 782—an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines 
that retroactively reduced certain drug crimes by two offense levels. See U.S.S.G. 
§§ 1B1.10(d), 2D1.1, U.S.S.G. App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 1, 2014); see also Hughes 




reasoning that Lawton received substantial benefits as a result of his guilty plea. This 
appeal followed. 
II2 
The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step approach to guide courts when 
reviewing claims brought under § 3582(c)(2). See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 
827 (2010). “At step one, § 3582(c)(2) requires the court to follow the Commission’s 
instructions . . . to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the 
extent of the reduction authorized.” Id. “At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs 
a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its 
discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.”3 Id.  
In appeals arising under § 3582(c), we exercise de novo review over “purely legal 
question[s] concerning the interpretation and legal status of § 3582(c)(2) and the related 
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 
531 (3d Cir. 2012). We review all other § 3582(c) rulings for abuse of discretion. Id. 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(2), and this 
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court “may affirm the District 
Court’s order ‘on any basis supported by the record.’” United States v. Rivera-Cruz, 904 
F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam)). 
 
3 Here, both parties agree that Lawton is eligible for a sentence reduction. Thus, only the 





Further, we review all constitutional questions de novo. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
905 F.3d 165, 205 (3d Cir. 2018).  
III 
Lawton’s theory is that the District Court impermissibly considered the parties’ 
plea negotiations when denying his § 3582(c) motion. His arguments misconstrue the 
record and are belied by apposite Supreme Court precedent. In Hughes v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a district court “can 
consider the benefits the defendant gained by entering a Type–C agreement when it 
decides whether a reduction is appropriate (or when it determines the extent of any 
reduction), ‘for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence.’” 
Id. at 1777 (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 532 (2011)). Further, as we 
explained in United States v. Baylin, a court may consider factual matters—like Lawton’s 
benefits from the Type–C agreement—as a basis for a sentence if there is “some minimal 
indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation” that bears “some rational relationship” to 
the sentence. 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute on other grounds 
as recognized in United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Contrary to the picture of unfounded speculation that Lawton paints, the District 
Court based its determination on reliable information in the record to determine that 
Lawton gained a substantial benefit upon entering into the plea agreement such that a 
reduction in his sentence was unwarranted. Specifically, the District Court appropriately 
reasoned that by pleading guilty, Lawton avoided “the very real risk that he would face 




at issue had resulted in the [overdose] death . . . .” App. 8. As the District Court 
explained, “[Lawton] benefited immensely from such an agreement [because] it 
eliminated the risk of a far greater sentence for [Lawton] and essentially represented a 
compromise between two or more statutory sentencing possibilities.” App. 9. 
Moreover, the District Court correctly observed that although the government’s 
allegations pertaining to his role in the overdose death “were never charged and proved,” 
they heavily influenced Lawton’s plea negotiations. App. 10. The record supports the 
District Court’s assessment. During oral argument on Lawton’s request for substitute 
counsel, Lawton chose to move forward with the plea agreement immediately after the 
government stated it would consider the plea agreement rejected and potentially bring 
charges associated with the overdose death. Also, Lawton’s initial counsel explained in a 
letter exhibit that the government agreed not to file a § 851 Information or superseding 
indictment in exchange for Lawton’s guilty plea, and subsequent counsel agreed that the 
potential charge pertaining to the overdose death “was likely material” to Lawton’s 
decision to plead guilty. Supp. App. 23, 34. Thus, the District Court correctly focused 
upon the benefits the plea agreement conferred upon Lawton, as contemplated in Hughes, 
138 S. Ct. at 1777. Lawton has not shown that the District Court erred in its analysis, and 
his constitutional and statutory arguments lack merit. 
* * * 
We will affirm the order of the District Court.  
